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Commentary
Of Taxes and Other Casualtiest
By JOEL S. NEWMAN*
Consider the following scenarios:
I. For personal reasons, you have chosen to live twenty-five miles
from your place of work. The housing market in your commu-
nity is now such that you cannot sell your home without taking
a huge financial loss. You have no choice but to commute by
automobile. This year, the price of gasoline rises 100%.
2. You feel compelled to take your child out of public school and
send him to an expensive private school.
3. You crash your automobile into a stone wall for fun. The auto-
mobile is demolished, but neither you nor the wall is harmed.
4. You have a one-car automobile accident.
a. You are negligent.
b. You are not negligent.
5. After three years of relatively trouble-free service, your auto-
mobile has frequent mechanical problems. By the end of the
year, you discover that you have spent three times the national
average for the maintenance and repair of that model car.
6. One day after the expiration of all warranties, your automobile
breaks down. Your mechanic, who is trustworthy, advises that
repairing the automobile would be prohibitively expensive. He
suggests that you junk it. You do so, even though you had in-
tended to keep it for another five years.
7. You buy a painting which pleases your eye for $25,000. The
salesman tells you that it is an original work of a well-known
artist. You later discover it to be a fraud, actually worth $500.
The salesman and his firm are judgment-proof.
8. The managers of your retirement fund make a very bad invest-
ment. The value of your fund declines from $25,000 to $500.
You have no cause of action against them.
9. Your gold watch is stolen in a robbery.
10. After not having worn your gold watch for months, you decide
to wear it to a dinner party. After a diligent search, you cannot
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find it. You have no idea if the watch was lost or stolen, and, if
stolen, when it was stolen. Further attempts to discover the
watch are of no avail.
11. A tree on your property is uprooted in a wind storm. It falls on
your house and destroys your roof.
12. A tree on your property is uprooted. It falls on your neighbor's
house and destroys his roof. You are liable for his damages.
All of these scenarios, in the absence of insurance, could be
financially devastating. Yet, only some of them give rise to personal
deductions under the Internal Revenue Code. Only scenarios 4, 9, and
11 are deductible casualty losses;' scenarios 2, 7, and 8 have only po-
tential tax consequences; 2 and scenarios 1, 3, 5, 6, 10, and 12 have no
tax consequences at all.
Can these differences be justified? Is selling a damaged car at a
loss different from selling a car after determining that it is a lemon?3 Is
the loss of a watch not ultimately the same as the theft of a watch?4 Is
there any justification for differentiating between the consequences of a
tree falling on one's roof and those of a tree falling on a neighbor's
roof, assuming that the same dollars leave one's pocket either way?
Should a shift in wind directions make that much difference? 5 This
Commentary focuses on the rationale for the choices made by the
drafters of the current Code in these situations, and proposes a scheme
for a better system of choices.
Ability to Pay
To analyze the treatment of the various disasters outlined above,
we must go back to the beginning-ability to pay. Although by now it
is a concept of somewhat faded elegance, it was once generally ac-
cepted that the proper method for apportioning the burden of taxation
was on the ability of a taxpayer to pay taxes. 6 The concept has fallen
1. See I.R.C. § 165 (1976). Unless otherwise indicated, all section citations refer to
the Internal Revenue Code.
2. In scenario ;7, you can generally assume that a subsequent sale of the painting will
be unlikely to produce taxable gain. In scenario #8, the decline in fund value will probably
result in less taxable income being paid out to you when you retire. In scenario #2, tuition
will be deductible under I.R.C. § 213 (1976) if you have medical reasons for sending your
child to private school. See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(v) (1974). In addition, many private
schools have a program of "voluntary" contributions to the endowment that are deductible
under I.R.C. § 170 (1976).
3. See infra notes 47-52 & accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 63-68 & accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 69-71 & accompanying text.
6. See H. GROVES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS (1974), for the thoughts of the following phi-
losophers and economists on ability to pay: Adam Smith, id. at 18; John Stuart Mills, id. at
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into disrepute on two grounds. First, it is very difficult to define "abil-
ity to pay" in a useful way. Therefore, true ability to pay is almost
impossible to measure.7 Second, application of a pure ability to pay
theory would require that those with the capacity to earn income
should be taxed on that capacity, whether or not that capacity is exer-
cised. Consider two street musicians, each of whom earns $5,000 a
year. One of them has the potential to earn $200,000 a year as a stock-
broker, but prefers his current vocation. Clearly, the potential stock-
broker has more ability to earn income than the other, hence he has
more ability to pay. However, if we tax him more heavily, we will
force him to give up his preferred life as a street musician and become
a stockbroker in order to pay his taxes. This forced labor seems too
close to slavery for many of us, and does present a serious problem for
the ability to pay theory.8
Notwithstanding these problems, ability to pay still has a nagging
attractiveness and in fact remains the basis of our taxation system.9
Other measures of tax apportionment are often justified as reasonably
close, workable approximations of a tax system truly based upon ability
to pay.10 Yet these measures of taxpaying capacity, including income,
29-35; E. R. A. Seligman, id. at 41, 44-45; A. C. Pigou, id. at 68-70. See also W. BLUM & H.
KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 64-68 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
W. BLUM]; R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 17-19, 21-25 (1976); P. MUSGRAVE &
R. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-8 (2d ed. 1976); 3 REP. OF THE
ROYAL COMM'N ON TAXATION 22-23 (1966) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL COMMISSION RE-
PORT]; H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 5, 17 (1938); Taubman, On Income Taxes,
in FEDERAL TAX REFORM: MYTHS & REALITIES 99 (M. Boskin ed. 1978); Andrews, Per-
sonal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REv. 309, 326-27 (1972); Buehler,
Ability to Pay, 1 TAX LAW REV. 243 (1946); Gunn, The Casefor an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 370, 378-88 (1979).
7. The ability to pay concept arguably serves to minimize the sacrifice each taxpayer
must make; by redistributing the tax burden according to ability to pay, the aggregate sacri-
fice suffered by taxpayers is minimized. Yet if ability to pay is measured solely by degree of
sacrifice, it becomes an impracticable standard by which to impose taxation. For example,
imagine two potential taxpayers who are financially equal, except that one has an inordinate
love for money. A coerced taking of even one penny from his hoard, even for as worthy a
cause as the public welfare, would create extreme anguish. He is making a larger sacrifice
than the non-miser. For those who truly believe in ability to pay, this taxpayer's extreme
love of money makes him less able to pay taxes than the other. Accordingly, a pure applica-
tion of ability to pay theory would require a comparison of the differing psychological satis-
factions that money brings to different individuals. Such measurements are impossible, if
not unfair. See R. GOODE, supra note 6, at 18.
8. See Gunn, supra note 6, at 381-82.
9. For example, the congressional purpose in enacting and revising the casualty loss
deduction was and continues to be stated in terms of ability to pay. See infra notes 12-15 &
accompanying text. See generally authority cited supra note 6.
10. See, e.g., 3 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 6, 27; R. GOODE, supra
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consumption, and wealth, are less than perfect as measures of ability to
pay. As to income, imagine the maharajah who lives off his previously
accumulated wealth, and the beggar outside his gate. Both could con-
ceivably have no income, but their ability to pay is markedly differ-
ent.11 As to consumption, imagine the extraordinarily frugal person
who consumes much less than his wealth or income might allow. On
the other hand, imagine the spendthrift who spends considerably more
than he is truly able to. As to wealth, consider the many Americans
with high incomes, high standards of living, but virtually no net worth.
On the other hand, imagine a person of very substantial net worth,
none of which is represented by liquid, or even income-producing
assets.
None of these measures of taxpaying capacity does a perfect job.
Consequently, serious proponents of any of these measures would al-
low adjustments to their measurements for events in the life of the tax-
payer which diminish ability to pay. The personal casualty loss
deduction is one such adjustment..12 Although there is no evidence as
to why it was originally proposed in 1867,1 3 the Committee Report ex-
plaining the introduction of the $100 floor in the Revenue Act of 1964
makes the ability to pay function clear:
Your Committee believes that in the case of nonbusiness casu-
alty and theft losses, it is appropriate in computing taxable income to
allow the deduction only of those losses which may be considered
extraordinary, nonrecurring losses, and which go beyond the average
or usual losses incurred by most taxpayers in day to day living....
note 6, at 2 1; Buehler, supra note 6, at 249-52; Gunn, supra note 6, at 378-83; Warren, Would
a Consumption Tax be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1092 (1980).
11. N. KALDOR, REPORTS ON TAXATION II 58 (1980).
12. Professor Bittker argues in his article, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsi-
diesfor Personal Expenditures, 16 J.L. & ECON. 193, 196-98 (1973), that instead of being an
adjustment to income based on ability to pay, the casualty loss deduction, in fact, represents
non-consumption and non-accumulation, and therefore is not income under the traditional
Haig-Simons definition: "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store
of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. In other words,
it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the period to 'wealth' at the
end of the period and then subtracting 'wealth' at the beginning." H. SIMONS, PERSONAL
INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). Under Professor Bittker's approach, an analysis of the scena-
rios in terms of non-consumption instead of ability to pay leads to the identical conclusion:
these events would never enter the Haig-Simons equation. For a similar argument with
respect to the medical expenses deduction, see Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal
Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REV. 309, 335-37 (1972).
It is also noteworthy that the Royal Canadian Commission, while purporting to base its
tax system on ability to pay, recommended the elimination of the casualty loss deduction. 3
ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 360.
13. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. 471, 478 (1867).
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This means that no deduction will be allowed in the case of an ordi-
nary "fender bending" accident or casualty, but that casualty and
theft losses will continue to be deductible (over the $100) in those
cases where they are sufficient in size to have a signtcant effect upon
an individual's ability to pay Federal income taxes.
14
More recently, in the Senate Finance Committee Report on the 1982
changes in the casualty loss deduction, the phrase "ability to pay" ap-
peared three times.15 Thus, in the eyes of Congress, the function of the
casualty loss deduction apparently has not changed.
The issue can now be restated. All of the scenarios described
above arguably have a significant effect on the ability to pay taxes. If
so, why are some of these reductions in the ability to pay recognized as
deductible casualties while others are not? This Commentary will fo-
cus on some of the specific anomalies raised by the scenarios, and will
propose a more comprehensive deduction scheme.
Pervasive Events and Threshold Amounts: Why Isn't a
Gasoline Price Hike a Deductible Casualty for the
Long-distance Commuter?
If a malevolent force were to destroy precisely three percent of the
adjusted gross income of every taxpayer in the nation overnight, should
some form of deduction be generally allowed on the basis of reduced
ability to pay? The answer is no. The idea of measuring taxpaying
capacity by income, consumption or wealth, and of adjusting those
measurements by some notion of ability to pay, is founded on the
premise that different taxpayers should pay taxes in different amounts.
In other words, the adjustments based on ability to pay are merely a
means of differentiating one taxpayer from another. If an event affects
every taxpayer in identical fashion, then that event is neither helpful
nor relevant in differentiating taxpayers. If everyone's ability to pay is
equally diminished, then taking such an event into account would ef-
fect an across-the-board rate reduction, rather than a readjustment of
the apportionment of tax burdens. Therefore, for our purposes, it
should be irrelevant.
How, then, should gasoline price hikes and inflation be dealt with
in the Code? One could argue that a gasoline price hike affects those
who drive more than those who do not, and that inflation affects those
on fixed incomes more than those who are not. It can be argued that
14. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1964) (emphasis added), reprintedin 1964-
1 C.B. 505.
15. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1982).
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nothing in the real world affects everyone's ability to pay identically,
and that no event can be eliminated from deductibility based on its
mere pervasiveness. Yet how can the differential effects on taxpaying
capacity of such pervasive events as inflation, gasoline price increases,
and war be measured? If pervasive events which differentiate taxpay-
ers are fair game for deductions, then the taxpayer who felt compelled
to build an expensive bomb shelter when President Carter withdrew
the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration, or the taxpayer who felt
compelled to purchase expensive video cassette equipment when his
local television station stopped showing reruns of the "Mary Tyler
Moore Show," should be permitted to deduct his expenses. It becomes
clear that measurement of these differentiating factors is so difficult
that all pervasive events must be disregarded entirely.
If pervasive events are nondeductible, can it be argued that events
resulting in casualty deductions are pervasive, and hence nondeduct-
ible? Individual casualties are not pervasive, but perhaps in the aggre-
gate they are. Perhaps taxpayer A was the only one who was
unfortunate enough to demolish his car last year. What if, in that same
year, taxpayer B's house burned down, taxpayer C had to replace his
home furnace which he purchased only last year, and taxpayer D lost
his watch? While most of the events listed are unlikely to happen to
everyone at the same time, one of the events is likely to happen to eve-
ryone at some time. Even if they don't all happen in a given year, it
can be argued that most people will experience about the same number
of events having unfortunate financial consequences over the course of
a lifetime. If casualty events are pervasive in the aggregate, perhaps
they should not be allowed to adjust tax bills.
The above analysis is inherently flawed. Some people are simply
unluckier than others. More importantly, even for those who have
equal amounts of financial catastrophe over the course of a lifetime, so
long as taxes are collected every year, the presence or absence of a
financial mishap in a particular year is of crucial importance. Yet, the
strength of the point remains. Everyone has some bad luck, and not all
bad luck has a significant effect on ability to pay, which is itself an
elusive concept. Ability to pay is diminished by financial catastrophe,
but smaller mishaps may have no such effect. Perhaps only when the
aggregate dollar amount of financial mishaps in a tax period exceeds a
certain set sum, or a certain set percentage of adjusted gross income,
should some adjustment be made.
Calls for a nondeductible threshold amount set at a sum certain
[Vol. 34
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began as early as 1947,16 and the $100 threshold was enacted in 1964.17
Other commentators argued for a threshold set as a percentage of ad-
justed gross income, similar to the medical expense deduction.' 8 Prior
to the 1982 legislation, suggested percentages ranged from one or two
percent 19 to four percent20 for casualty losses alon.e, and from seven
percent2' to ten percent 22 for aggregated casualty and medical
expenses.
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)
maintains the $100 threshold, but introduces an aggregate threshold of
ten percent of adjusted gross income for the casualty loss deduction
alone.23 A separate five percent threshold limits allowable medical ex-
pense deductions. 24 The Report of the Senate Finance Committee on
this legislation gives two reasons for the casualty loss changes. First,
since the deduction creates "significant problems of complexity, record-
keeping, and audit for both individuals and the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice,"'25 the measure will "minimize the number of users of this complex
deduction .... "26 Second:
[T]he committee is aware that the casualty loss floor has not
been raised from $100 since 1964, despite the inflation of recent
years. Furthermore, the committee is concerned with the fact that
the deduction offsets a higher percentage of losses for high-bracket
than for low-bracket taxpayers, even though the latter are less able to
purchase insurance to avoid losses and also are more likely to need
assistance in coping with expenses. In addition, the committee be-
lieves that the $100 floor is not an appropriate measure to identify
extraordinary casualty losses that should be taken into account by
the tax system because of their impact on an individual's ability to
pay taxes.
2 7
16. W. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 62 (1947).
17. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 208(a), 78 Stat. 19, 43 (1964).
18. See Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Basefor Individuals, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 815,
826 (1958). For a chronology of similar percentage thresholds with respect to the medical
deduction, see Newman, The Medical Expense Deduction: A Preliminary Postmortem, 53 S.
CAL. L. REv. 787, 789-94 (1980).
19. See Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 11 n.11
(1957).
20. President's Message to Congress Recommending Tax Reduction and Reform, 1963
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD'. NEWS 1429, 1440.
21. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGE 112 (1973).
22. H.R. 12078, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See Taubman, supra note 6, at 99.
23. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 208(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 165(h) (West Supp. 1983).
24. TEFRA § 202(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 213(a) (West Supp. 1983).
25. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1982).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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One could argue that, given the new percentage threshold, retain-
ing the per casualty threshold of $100 is superfluous. Casualties aggre-
gating over ten percent of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income have the
same affect on ability to pay, whether they are comprised of one or two
major casualties or many smaller casualties. Losing a button from a
shirt or breaking a pencil could, if combined with enough other casual-
ties, affect ability to pay. However, the administrative costs of keeping
track of such minor events would be prohibitive. Some threshold sum
is necessary, and the $100 floor is not unreasonable.
It can also be argued that all deductions which are intended to
adjust the tax burden for significant reductions in ability to pay ought
to be considered together. For example, of two taxpayers with identical
adjusted gross incomes of $50,000, one has $2,000 of medical expenses
and $18,000 of casualty losses in the taxable year, while the other has
$18,000 in medical expenses and $2,000 in casualty losses. There is no
difference in their ability to pay, yet under TEFRA, the first taxpayer
could deduct only $13,000 while the second could deduct $15,500.28
Clearly, the separate percentage thresholds in the 1982 Act for medical
expenses and casualty losses are inappropriate from an ability to pay
perspective. 29
The TEFRA changes, on the whole, are a step in the right direc-
tion. It is incontrovertible that a $1,000 loss has much less effect on the
millionaire than it does on the low income taxpayer. It is clearly more
effective to define significant reductions in ability to pay in terms of
percentages of income rather than in terms of absolute dollars. How-
ever, now that the casualty loss deduction has been confined to events
which are truly significant in terms of percentage of income, it is neces-
sary to reevaluate and broaden the scope of the casualty loss concept.
28. Ignoring the $100 per casualty floor, the first taxpayer could deduct $13,000 of cas-
ualty losses but none of his medical expenses ($2,000 is less than the 5% threshold of $2,500),
for a total of $13,000. In contrast, the second taxpayer could deduct $15,500 in medical
expenses but none of the casualty losses, for a total of $15,500.
29. The difference in the limits for medical and casualty deductions has long been the
subject of criticism. See generally C. KAHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL IN-
COME TAX 156-61 (1960). There is no suggestion in the current Act that Congress intends to
aggregate medical and casualty losses. See S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 115-17
(1982).
Although medical and casualty deductions are the two most obvious candidates for
aggregation, other deductions which relate to ability to pay should be considered as well.
Examples include business bad debts, I.R.C. § 166 (1976), and divorce expenses, I.R.C.
§ 215 (1976).
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Voluntary vs. Involuntary: Why Can't Tuition Costs and
Crashing Cars for Fun Be Deductible Casualties?
The short answer is that these expenditures are voluntarily caused
by the taxpayer. A system that allowed taxpayers to reduce their tax
burdens by voluntary, conscious reductions in their ability to pay
would quickly fall apart.
Consider two individuals, each of whom has no source of income
other than a trust account which generates $50,000 a year, payable on
April 16. Taxes are due April 15 of the following year. One individual
lives somewhat conservatively, spending only $25,000 in the year.
Therefore, on April 15 of the following year, there is $25,000 left with
which to pay any tax which may fall due. The other individual spends
extravagantly, using up the entire $50,000. Clearly, the one who has
used up all of the income is less able to pay taxes on April 15 than the
one who has $25,000 left over. Is it appropriate to recognize this differ-
ence in ability to pay of the two individuals? No. The different taxpay-
ing capacities of the two individuals result entirely from conscious
choice. Allowing such choices to affect tax liability would make the tax
truly voluntary. Taxes would be paid only if the taxpayer chose to live
in a manner that reserved funds with which to pay the tax when it came
due. Such a scheme would encourage profligate behavior, which some
would argue ought not be encouraged. More of us would argue that a
fair system of taxation ought to treat varying types of personal behavior
neutrally, wherever possible.30 Since treating the profligate individual
differently would violate neutrality, it should not be allowed. Neutral-
ity is important to taxation for four reasons. First, neutrality is a hall-
mark of fairness. Second, a non-neutral tax system encourages
taxpayers to vary their economic behavior, thus distorting the function-
ing of the market system and reducing the efficiency of the national
economy. Third, a neutral system is most likely to be the simplest sys-
tem; complexity in a tax system should be avoided where possible.
Fourth, any non-neutral system will be resented by those taxpayers on
the short end of the stick. That resentment will reduce taxpayer mo-
rale, and make voluntary compliance with the tax laws more difficult. 31
The foregoing analysis suggests that no expenditure which is the
30. See, e.g., N. KALDOR, supra note 11, at 46; Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for
Implementing Government Policy: 4 Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83
HARV. L. REv. 705 (1970). See generally Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy,
17 STAN. L. REv. 567 (1965).
31. Cf. Surrey, supra note 30, at 719-32 (pointing out similar problems with tax incen-
tives and arguing that they should be replaced with direct governmental expenditures).
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result of conscious choice should be deductible. On this theory, the
losses from the car crashing for fun scenario (#3) and the tuition scena-
rio (#2) should not be deductible. The driver clearly did not have to
crash his automobile. This purported loss was purely entertainment,
and should be no more deductible than an expensive trip to a night
club or an extravagant meal. Similarly, in scenario #2 the free public
school option remained; the children did not have to go to private
school. 32
The above analysis also suggests that if an expenditure is suffi-
ciently involuntary it ought to be deductible. Suppose that the parents
in scenario #2 raise the following grounds to prove that their expendi-
ture was involuntary:
1. God would strike them down if they sent their child to an atheist
public school.
2. If they didn't send their child to private school, they would be
hounded out of their social club.
3. If the child went to public school he would be associating with
minorities. The parents believe this association would have neg-
ative consequences.
4. The parents are- convinced that if their child attends public
school, he will not achieve his full potential.
5. The parents are convinced that if their child attends public
school, the school will be so inadequate to the child's special edu-
cational needs that the child will not fulfill his minimal potential,
and will leave the public school system a functional illiterate.
6. The child occasionally has been taunted by some of the tougher
children in the school yard. The parents fear such taunts will
leave deep emotional scars.
7. The child has been hospitalized three times after having been
attacked by gang members in the school yard.
Which of these arguments should be accepted? Perhaps some par-
ents would lie about their feelings, but how could it be proved without
incurring prohibitive administrative costs? As to reason #3, the gen-
eral governmental policy against racial discrimination suggests that
such a motivation is unacceptable.
The problem of evaluating the parents' subjective motivation
could be avoided by using a reasonable and prudent person standard.
Would reasonable and prudent parents have felt compelled to send the
child to private school under the circumstances alleged? Unfortu-
32. The issue of tax relief for private school tuition clearly transcends ability-to-pay
analysis. See generally Frey, The Tuition Tax Credit: Uncertain Directions in Public Policy,
in FAMILY CHOICE IN SCHOOLING 135 (M. Manley-Casimer ed. 1982); Hunter, The Continu-
ing Debate Over Tuition Tax Credits, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 523 (1980); Note, Govern-
ment Neutrality and Separation of Church and State. Tuition Tax Credits, 92 HARV. L. REV.
696 (1979).
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nately, such a standard does not avoid expensive case-by-case determi-
nations. Moreover, whether or not the parents' feelings were
reasonable has nothing to do with the effect of their tuition expenditure
on their ability to pay taxes.
The response of the current system to the problem of voluntary
versus involuntary expenditures has been two-fold. First, some argua-
bly voluntary disasters are simply carved out from the definition of
"casualty," and are treated by other sections of the Code.33 If the event
is not a fire, storm, shipwreck, or some other sudden, unexpected occur-
rence, it is not a deductible casualty under section 165(c)(3). Second, if
an otherwise deductible casualty is the product of a willful act or will-
ful negligence,34 it is nondeductible.
Clearly, the categorical approach of current law uses a meat-axe
rather than a scalpel; many expenditures which significantly affect the
taxpayer's ability to pay are simply carved out from the definition of
casualty, whether the taxpayer considers them involuntary or not.
Even for those events which might arguably be classified casualties, the
precision of the "willful act" exception is questionable.35 Yet, in view
of the significant administrative difficulties and expense of a more pre-
cise approach, perhaps a meat-axe is all we can afford.
Should Negligence Matter?
If casualty losses caused by voluntary acts are nondeductible, is a
negligent act a voluntary act? Unfortunately, on a continuum from
voluntary to involuntary, negligence falls in between "had to" and "did
not have to," closer to the fuzzier "could have prevented." The loca-
tion of negligence on the voluntary/involuntary continuum is not help-
ful, but there are other arguments that can be made in support of both
the relevance and the irrelevance of negligence as a factor in determin-
ing the deductibility of a casualty loss.
33. Section 166(d), for example, defines a nonbusiness bad debt as a debt not created,
acquired, or made worthless in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business. The section
provides further that the loss resulting from the worthlessness of a nonbusiness bad debt
shall be considered a capital loss. I.R.C. § 166(d) (1976).
Section 71 deals with the effect of alimony and maintenance payments on the recipient's
gross income, and § 215 allows a corresponding deduction to the payor for the amount con-
stituting alimony under § 71. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (1976).
If medically related, tuition expenses receive treatment under section 213 comparable to
"casualty" treatment. See .rupra note 2.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(3)(i) (1977) creates this standard specifically for automo-
bile accidents. It almost certaintly applies to other casualties as well.
35. For a discussion of negligence, see infra notes 37-39 & accompanying text.
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Argument Pro. Casualty Losses Caused by Negligence Should Be Deductible
The tax law ought to take taxpayers as it finds them, not as they
should be. The law does not tax a poor person more heavily merely
because he had the potential to be rich had he worked harder. Simi-
larly, the law should not tax the accident victim more heavily than his
ability to pay would warrant merely because he should have been more
careful. To say that deductions for casualties caused by negligence en-
courages negligent behavior makes as much sense as saying that our
progressive tax structure encourages people to become poor. A truly
neutral system should not inquire into negligence.
Our tax system generally espouses the notion that negligence is not
material.36 Yet, the system is much more likely to question the reason-
ableness of the behavior leading to an alleged deductible expense in the
area of personal activity than it is in the area of business activity. This
is true for two reasons. First, there is a general bias in favor of business
deductions, which are necessary to the integrity of net income as a base
for taxation. Conversely, there is a general bias against personal de-
ductions, which are not necessary for this integrity.37
Second, it is less necessary to require taxpayers to be reasonable,
or careful, in their business activities than in their personal activities.
The object of business activity is to maximize profits. Unreasonable
expenditures and careless activities work directly against profit max-
imization. Therefore, taxpayers attempt to keep their business ex-
penses within reason even without being so required by the tax laws.
No such constraints external to the tax laws exist with respect to per-
sonal expenses. There is no profit maximization criterion for personal
life; personal expenses, if unreasonable, merely shift assets away from
other personal expenses. Therefore, since there are no non-tax con-
straints, it is up to the tax laws to require reasonableness in personal
36. Support for this proposition comes from the absence of the word "reasonable" in
most of the deduction statutes. Except for § 162(a)(1) with respect to reasonable compensa-
tion and § 162(a)(2) with respect to travel expenses which are not lavish or extravagant, the
Internal Revenue Code does not require that deductible expenses be reasonable in amount.
I.R.C. § 162(a)(l)-(2) (1976). The Treasury regulations do suggest that "ordinary and neces-
sary" investment expenses under § 212 must be reasonable in amount. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-
l(d) (1977). However, the word "reasonable" does not appear in § 212. See I.R.C. § 212
(1976). Also, since "ordinary and necessary" clearly does not mean "reasonable" for the
purpose of § 162 business deductions, I.R.C. § 162 (1976), this regulation is probably incor-
rect with respect to § 212. It is most significant that neither the casualty loss nor the medical
expense deduction sections require that deductible personal expenses be reasonable. I.R.C.
§§ 165, 213 (1976). If expenses can be unreasonable, they can be deducted even if they
resulted from negligence.
37. See generally C. KAHN, supra note 29, at 1, 12.
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activities constituting deductible expenses. 38
In this respect, however, casualty losses are closer to business ex-
penses than they are to personal expenses. People like to spend money
on other personal expenses. In spite of the truism that money cannot
buy happiness, most people would prefer to spend more money on
food, clothing, and shelter rather than less. The same observation can-
not be made about casualties. No one likes to spend money making up
for casualty losses. As long as the tax rates are lower than 100%, the
effect of the casualty, even after a tax deduction, is still financially det-
rimental. Therefore, since there are non-tax constraints upon incurring
casualty losses, taxpayer reasonableness need not be of primary con-
cern. With this concern eliminated, the general principle of taking tax-
payers as they are leads to the conclusion that even negligent casualty
losses ought to be deductible.
Argument Con: Casualty Losses Caused by Negligence Should Not Be
Deductible
On the other hand, it can be argued that differences in lifestyle and
conscious personal choices ought not to affect tax burdens. All else
being equal, whether a taxpayer eats steak or peanut butter, or whether
he uses his leisure hours reading books from the public library or on an
extravagant night on the town ought not to affect his tax bill. The deci-
sion to be careless is simply another variant of the decision to be ex-
travagant in one's personal affairs. Neither ought to affect one's tax
burden.
Assume that two taxpayers own similar personal automobiles.
One keeps his automobile in as safe operating condition as is humanly
possible, while the other keeps maintenance expenses to a minimum.
Assume that, over their lifetimes, the "safe" taxpayer spent $10,000
more on maintenance and had no accidents. The other lost $10,000
due to automobile accidents. Aren't these expenditures comparable? If
the maintenance is nondeductible, shouldn't the casualties be
nondeductible?39
38. For a similar argument in the context of the medical expense deduction, see New-
man, supra note 18, at 788-89.
39. The $10,000 in casualty losses might, of course, be partially or fully nondeductible
by virtue of the $100 and 10% adjusted gross income thresholds. However, for those who
believe that maintenance and casualty expenses ought to be treated the same, the possibili-
ties of nondeductibility caused by the thresholds do not solve the problem.
These examples are inspired by similar examples used to criticize the casualty deduc-
tion for discriminating against insurance in W. VICKREY, supra note 16, at 60.
For a comparable suggestion that many medical expenditures result from prior personal
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The argument can be phrased another way. There is a short term
monetary benefit in carelessness. In its most concrete form, it saves
hard cash. Failure to maintain an automobile properly now saves the
money that it would have taken to do so. It also saves time, and time is
money. Proper maintenance of machines takes time, and doing things
carefully usually takes longer than doing things carelessly.
If one is a hedonist, there is an intrinsic joy in being careless. For
some, it is more fun to drive down the highway at eighty miles an hour
than it is to drive at fifty-five. The enjoyment derives not merely from
getting to one's destination sooner, but also from the thrill of speed and
danger. Therefore, careless living creates value, and hence income,
from the money saved on maintenance, the time saved, and the psychic
thrill of doing something carelessly. None of this imputed income is
taxed. In the event a deduction for negligent activity is allowed, the
careless person receives a double benefit: nontaxable imputed income
and a deduction which will reduce other taxable income. Thus, the
careless person is put in a better tax position than the prudent person,
who had no imputed income from careless living, but had no casualty
losses either. Therefore, if the premise that personal lifestyles shouldn't
affect taxes is to hold true, where the income created by negligence is
not taxable, the losses caused by negligence ought not to be deductible
either.
Neither the argument pro nor con produces a clear winner. Yet,
our system allows the deductibility of negligent casualty losses. Per-
haps this choice can be justified on other grounds. First, it is the com-
passionate choice. Second, requiring a taxpayer to prove that a
casualty loss did not result from negligence before allowing a deduc-
tion for the loss would inject another difficult issue into our tax system
which would have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. These factors
support the conclusion that casualty losses caused by negligence should
continue to be deductible.
Should Insurance Matter?
The question of negligence leads unavoidably to the question of
insurance. Should the presence or absence of insurance coverage mat-
ter? The threshold answer is that if ability to pay is the criterion, then
only those losses uncompensated by insurance should be deductible.
When an otherwise deductible casualty loss is fully covered by insur-
decisions to live in an unhealthy manner, see Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited- Why
They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Far Worse in a Far From Ideal
World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 868-69 (1979).
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ance, then there is no loss of money, and hence no decline in ability to
pay.
In fact, this is the answer of our current system.40 This answer,
however, furnishes ammunition for some of the strongest criticisms of
the casualty loss deduction.41 In effect, since there is no deduction for
the cost of insurance premiums, our system discourages insurance.
Taxpayers who insure receive no deductions for the cost of the insur-
ance, and no tax mitigation when casualties occur, assuming that those
casualties are fully covered. Taxpayers who do not insure do not miss
out on a deduction for insurance premiums, and do receive deductions
for their uncompensated losses.
Consider two taxpayers. One purchases casualty insurance at an
aggregate cost over twenty years of $1,000; the other does not. Both
suffer a casualty loss of $1,000 at the end of the twentieth year. The
uninsured taxpayer incurs the loss; the insured taxpayer is fully covered
by his policy. In effect, both taxpayers have paid the same amount-
the $1,000 of insurance premiums paid by the one taxpayer spread over
twenty years is in effect equal to the $1,000 loss suffered by the other
taxpayer at the end of the period. However, only the uninsured tax-
payer receives a deduction for this expenditure. As a result, the tax
laws actually discourage the use of insurance.42
The basic question of insurance, however, is simply the negligence
question in a different form. Surely, it is not desirable to have everyone
insure against everything no matter how remote the risk. Reasonable
insurance against reasonably foreseeable harm is enough. Therefore,
failure to insure should be relevant when it was unreasonable-hence
negligent-not to insure. Denying a deduction due to failure to insure
is merely a variant of denying a deduction due to negligence. Perhaps
the insurance dimension makes the stakes of the issue more clear.
However, it ought not to change the outcome.43
40. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1976).
41. See R. GOODE, supra note 6, at 162-63; 3 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
6, at 360; U.S. DE,'T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 97-98 (1977); W.
VICKREY, supra note 16, at 61; Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of Personal Property
Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 STAN. L. REv. 454, 467-68 (1971).
42. To the extent that the uninsured $1,000 casualty loss is nondeductible by virtue of
the $100 and 10% of adjusted gross income thresholds, the tax laws might not discourage
insurance in this instance. However, if one asserts that the tax laws ought never to discour-
age insurance, then the rejoinder that they only sometimes discourage insurance is not
satisfactory.
43. Admittedly, the absence of insurance has a direct effect on ability to pay. However,
not all significant reductions in ability to pay give rise to deductions. For example, a casu-
alty caused by willful negligence reduces ability to pay, but is not deductible. Therefore, it is
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What about the decision not to make an insurance claim for a cas-
ualty which is clearly covered by the policy? On the one hand, such an
expenditure appears to be voluntary. Had the insurance claim been
made, the casualty would not have diminished the taxpayer's ability to
pay. Paying for the casualty without insurance reimbursement does re-
duce ability to pay, but it does so in just the sort of voluntary, conscious
fashion that ought not to give rise to a deduction.
On the other hand, the decision may not be entirely voluntary.
Assuming the taxpayer knew that, if he made one more insurance
claim, the insurer would refuse to renew his policy, or would raise the
premium rates prohibitively high, the decision would no longer be
completely within the taxpayer's control. What if the taxpayer merely
determines that the cost of paying for this casualty himself will be less
than the cost over time of paying increased insurance premiums? Ar-
guably, a rational decision to pay for a casualty rather than making a
claim should not be discouraged.
One recent decision appears to take this approach. According to
the court in Hills v. Commissioner,44 the use of the word "compensated"
rather than the word "covered" in section 165(a) implies that losses
which are covered by insurance policies, but which are not compen-
sated by the insurer for whatever reason, are still deductible.45 How-
ever, the recent trend of case law, according to one commentator,
would require that the decision not to file a claim be "involuntary. 46
This standard would require a determination that the financial penalty
for filing a claim was so severe that it was not a realistic option. Would
requiring such a determination be worth the administrative costs?
Again, a case-by-case decision would be necessary.
necessary to consider whether the reduction in ability to pay caused by failure to insure is
that sort of reduction which should give rise to a deduction. Failure to insure is simply a
form of negligence, and therefore should affect deductibility no more than negligence does.
There is some indication that Congress has changed its mind on this issue. The Senate
Finance Committee Report on the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 states,
in justification of the change in the casualty loss deduction: "Furthermore, the committee is
concerned with the fact that the deduction offsets a higher percentage of losses for high-
bracket than for low-bracket taxpayers, even though the latter are less able to purchase insur-
ance to avoid losses ...... S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1982) (emphasis
added). This comment could mean that those who cannot afford to purchase insurance have
an even stronger argument for deductions than those who can. If so, it could also mean that
those who could and should have purchased insurance, but did not, ought to be denied a
deduction.
44. 76 T.C. 484 (1981).
45. Id. at 486-88.
46. Tripp & Vogel, Unreimbursed Insured Casualty Losses After Hills, 60 TAXES 154
(1982).
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The actual harm in allowing deductions for unreasonable deci-
sions to forego insurance coverage would be minimal. It will not hap-
pen often because, even with the deduction, such decisions cost the
taxpayer money. Moreover, the real abuses, such as cases of disguised
gifts to insurers, or claims foregone due to under-the-table bribes, are
fraudulent and could be treated as such. Requiring that the decision to
forego insurance claims be reasonable would impose an unnecessary
administrative burden. In light of the foregoing, the current trend de-
nying the casualty loss deduction only where the loss is compensated, is
a good one.
Repairs: Why Should a Lemon be Treated
Differently From a Wreck?
A driver who, negligently or not, substantially damages his auto-
mobile in an accident will presumably either repair the automobile or
replace it. The event which diminishes ability to pay is not really the
accident but is the resulting expenditure. All vehicles are repaired or
replaced in the normal course of their use. The expenditure is too per-
vasive to warrant a deduction. Only when the expenditure is caused by
something as extraordinary as an accident is a deduction permitted.
And yet, owning a lemon is just as extraordinary as having an accident,
when viewed as a cause for expenditure.
The problem of the lemon cannot be entirely separated from negli-
gence. While some automobiles are lemons from birth, others develop
the "citrus" condition through the negligence of their owners.
Automobiles which are negligently driven are likely to require more
frequent repair and last for a shorter time than automobiles which are
not so driven. Moreover, automobiles which are negligently main-
tained in the early years will probably require more costly repairs in
later years, and have shorter lives. That ordinary repair and replace-
ment expenditures should not be deductible is illustrated by the follow-
ing examples. Consider automobile owners A and B. Owner A
scrupulously maintains his car at regular intervals, while owner B does
not. The repair bills of the two owners, as opposed to their mainte-
nance bills, are virtually identical for the first three years of ownership.
After that, owner B's repair bills exceed those of owner A. Over the
lifetime of the cars, each owner spends the same for maintenance and
repair. Given that none of owner A's normal maintenance and repair
is deductible, why should any of owner B's excessive repairs in later
years be deductible?
Consider automobile owners C and D. Owner C scrupulously
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maintains his automobile. His automobiles last an average of ten
years. Owner D is very lax about maintaining his automobiles; they
last an average of five years. Assume further that C's cost of maintain-
ing, repairing, and replacing automobiles over his lifetime are equal to
those of owner D. Why should owner D's more frequent replacement
costs be deductible, while owner C's maintenance and repair costs are
not?
4 7
One cannot resolve the dilemma posed by owners A, B, C, and D
by merely stating that negligence ought to be irrelevant. The fact still
remains that all four owners have repair and replacement expenses.
Most of such expenses are quite ordinary. They are routine costs of
owning an automobile, and have no better justification for deductibility
than does the initial decision to buy an automobile for personal use.48
It is only extraordinary repair and replacement expenses that affect
ability to pay. Extraordinary repair expenses could easily be defined as
those repair expenses which, for example, exceed the national annual
average by fifty percent. With such a definition, based on currently
available statistics, 49 a repair deduction would be workable.
As to replacement, the problem is more difficult. A standard
based upon mere frequency of replacement would not be satisfactory.
Many people replace perfectly good automobiles frequently, merely for
the pleasure of owning a newer automobile. Such behavior surely does
not deserve a special deduction. On the other hand, limiting the deduc-
tion to those who prematurely sell their automobiles for scrap value
rather than to another driver would be overly restrictive. Just because
someone is willing to buy an automobile does not mean that it is not a
lemon.
A pricing mechanism could be used to draw the line between ordi-
47. The saga of owners C and D was inspired by W. VICKREY, supra note 16, at 60.
See Lyle W. Mader, T.C.M. (P-H) 66,176 (1966), for an interesting but ultimately unsuc-
cessful argument that major repairs after only 42,000 miles on an automobile as supposedly
sturdy as a Mercedes-Benz should be a deductible casualty.
48. The major reason that the Royal Commission recommended against the casualty
deduction was this inability to distinguish casualty loss from depreciation. 3 ROYAL COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 360.
The current session of Congress was also concerned with this distinction. The Senate
Report noted that "[airbitrary lines must be drawn between deductible expenditures for sud-
den casualty losses and nondeductible losses caused by gradual deterioration." S. REP. No.
494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1982).
49. See Frequency-of-Repair Records, 1975-80, 46 CONSUMER REPORTS 225-35 (1980).
Currently available repair statistics suggest that average repair expenses could easily be de-
termined by the Secretary of the Treasury. See the proposed statutory scheme, section
(b)(6), set out at the end of this Commentary.
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nary and extraordinary replacement costs. Standard values of used
automobiles are easily available.50 A statute which allowed a deduc-
tion for the difference between selling price and "bluebook" value of a
used automobile, but only when the selling price is less than fifty per-
cent of the bluebook value, would carve out a deductible niche for lem-
ons, as long as collusive sales could be detected.5'
The foregoing discussion also suggests that extraordinary repair
and replacement costs of all assets-not just automobiles-should be
candidates for deductions. However, for the suggested statutory ap-
proach to be administratively enforceable, reliable repair expense and
used asset value statistics are indispensable. Moreover, automobiles
are expensive assets. Automobile repair and replacement costs are
more likely to affect ability to pay than are similar costs for other as-
sets, such as can openers, electric pencil sharpeners, and the like.
Therefore, although an ideal system would allow deductions for all as-
sets which turn out to be "lemons," it is submitted that a statute di-
rected only to automobiles would effect a significant improvement
without creating an administrative nightmare.52
In conclusion, repair and replacement costs affect ability to pay
whether caused by an accident or by the fact that the vehicle is a
lemon. Excessive automobile repair and replacement costs, as opposed
to ordinary maintenance, can be statutorily defined, and should be
deductible.5 3
Realization: Why Shouldn't the Decline in the Value of a
Painting or a Retirement Fund Be Deductible?
The short answer is that these declines are unrealized.5 4 Taxation
of unrealized fluctuations in market values would require periodic ap-
praisals of all assets with all the uncertainty and expense that valuation
entails. In contrast, when taxpayer action leads to realized gains or
50. NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE DEALERS' AsS'N, OFFICIAL USED CAR GUIDE (S.E. ed.
1982).
51. The problem of detecting some collusive sales can be dealt with by adopting a
"related party" provision that would deny a deduction when the buyer of the automobile is
so closely related to the seller that the transaction was not at arm's length and the selling
price probably did not reflect the market value of the automobile. A similar provision is
currently used to prevent the artificial creation of loss, expense, and interest deductions.
I.R.C. § 267 (1976).
52. Excessive home repair costs might be a workable category, although no average
repair statistics exist for homes.
53. See the proposed statute set out at the end of this Commentary.
54. For a discussion of realization concepts, see 1 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
ATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS § 5.2 (1981).
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losses, the value is fixed by the realization event, and the speculative
appraisal process is unnecessary. In addition to valuation problems,
taxation of unrealized appreciation might levy a tax at a time when the
taxpayer has no liquid assets with which to pay the tax. Such a tax
might force the taxpayer to liquidate his appreciated assets prema-
turely. Because of the problems of valuation and liquidity, unrealized
appreciation and depreciation have traditionally been unrecognized in
our system.
Most unrealized losses result from economic events which are too
pervasive to be casualties and are, therefore, not deductible under the
current system. Perhaps, however, a category of unrealized losses
caused by unique events could be carved out as casualty losses and
considered for special treatment. In Pulvers v. Commissioner, 55 a land-
slide in the neighborhood did no physical damage to the taxpayer's
property, but did create a decline in its market value. The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that there was no realized loss, and hence no deduction. The
Court did imply, however, that it might have ruled differently if egress
or ingress to the property had been impaired, or if the future adverse
consequences were so certain that the taxpayer abandoned his prop-
erty. As a general rule, deductions for unrealized casualty losses have
been disallowed.56
Do unrealized casualty losses fare any differently when viewed
through the lens of ability to pay? Arguably not. Ability to pay taxes is
essentially a function of liquid assets. Admittedly, those liquid assets
are backed up by net worth, whether liquid or not. However, only in
an extreme situation would a taxpayer liquidate all of his assets in or-
der to pay his taxes. Therefore, a mere decline in net worth will have
only a remote effect on most taxpayers' ability to pay current tax
liabilities.
Under our system, unrealized fluctuations are not recognized, real-
ized appreciation is taxed, and realized declines in value are candidates
for possible deduction. 57 A realized decline in value, however, does not
actually reduce ability to pay. Consider the taxpayer whose $25,000
painting declined in value to $500. The mere decline in value admit-
55. 407 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1969).
56. See, e.g., Kamanski v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1973); L.F. Ford, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) 496 (1974); R. C. Fryer, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 403 (1974); J. S. Hocker, 28
T.C.M. (CCH) 633 (1969); J. B. Thornton, 47 T.C. 1 (1966); C. A. Peterson, 30 T.C. 660
(1958); see also Rev. Rul. 66-242, 1966-2 C.B. 56. See generally Comment, Federal Income
Tax: The Dilemma offhe Casualty Loss Deduction, 1961 DUKE L.J. 440, 448-50.
57. See I B. BITTKER, supra note 54, § 5.2.
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tedly has little effect on ability to pay.58 Were the taxpayer to sell his
painting for $500, he would have converted a nonliquid asset into a
liquid asset. Because he would have $500 more liquid assets than he
did before the sale, the realization of this loss would increase his liquid-
ity and hence his ability to pay. Unless the tax system was completely
based on cash flow, 59 this analysis would destroy the function of reali-
zation in the current income tax scheme. This analysis does show,
however, that realization might be treated differently when ability to
pay, rather than income, is the criterion.
Now consider the taxpayer whose $25,000 retirement fund declines
in value to $500. This taxpayer might feel obligated to take $25,000 or
more from some other source to put his retirement fund back at a level
which he deems necessary. Here, the unrealized decline in market
value sets into motion a required expenditure of other funds, which
clearly lessens the taxpayer's ability to pay.
Realized losses and gains are considered for recognition by the tax
system, while unrealized losses and gains are not. However, the above
analysis suggests that some unrealized losses have an immediate effect
on ability to pay, while some realized losses do not. Ability to pay may
be a more appropriate measure than "realization" in determining the
deductibility of casualty losses.
Consider the loss, theft, or destruction of X's watch. If the watch
was X's only watch, and X considered the ownership of a watch crucial,
X would have had to replace it. Clearly, the dollars spent replacing the
watch would reduce X's ability to pay taxes. However, what if the de-
parted watch had not been X's only watch? What if, in fact, X did not
like the watch, and only wore it to please his mother, who gave it to X?
Under this set of facts, X probably would not replace the watch. If no
dollars were expended to replace the watch, there would be no decline
in X's ability to pay.
Alternatively, assume that X was very fond of the departed watch,
but could not afford to replace it. The loss of this watch may distress X,
but it does not set in motion an expenditure of dollars which immedi-
ately reduces X's ability to pay taxes. Under an ability to pay analysis,
any casualty loss deduction should be deferred until X replaces the be-
58. Hanes v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 213 (1943). The rationale of Hanes is questioned in
Comment, supra note 56, at 444, on the theory that there is no significant difference between
theft and misrepresentation. However, if realization is relevant, theft is a realized loss while
misrepresentation is not.
59. See Andrews,,, Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV.
L. REv. 1113 (1974).
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loved watch.60
Suppose the door of Z's automobile receives a minor dent in a
parking lot accident. Whether or not the accident reduces Z's ability to
pay depends upon whether or not Z chooses to fix the dent. Assume
that it costs $200 to fix the dent. The tortfeasor offers either to reim-
burse Z for the expenses of fixing the dent or to pay Z $100 cash, and Z
chooses the cash. Does Z have a $200 casualty loss reduced by $100 of
compensation, leaving a net loss of $100?61 Perhaps it would be more
accurate to say that Z had a $100 windfall.
As the foregoing analysis suggests, realization should be irrelevant
to the casualty loss deduction. Instead, the operative event should be
the expenditure of funds to repair or replace the damaged asset. More-
over, the fact that the decision to spend money is voluntary should be
of no consequence in determining the deductibility of the loss.
Assume that the following personal assets are involuntarily
destroyed:
1. An iron lung.
2. A supply of food.
3. An automobile (the taxpayer's sole source of transportation).
4. A television set.
5. A collection of baseball cards.
Using a reasonable and prudent person standard, the decision to re-
place the assets arguably shifts from involuntary to voluntary as one
goes down the list. Under an ability to pay analysis, there are two rea-
sons why the voluntary nature of the decision to replace should be ir-
relevant to deductibility. First, it is sufficient to require that the
60. Allowing X to replace the watch later and still obtain a deduction could lead to
administrative difficulties. For example, what if X were to replace the expensive watch,
currently valued at $500, with the best one X could currently afford, costing $100. What if X
subsequently strikes it rich, and replaces the $100 watch with a $5,000 watch, at a time when
a watch comparable to the one X lost would have cost $2,000?. For an imperfect but worka-
ble solution to this issue, see the proposed statute set out at the end of this Commentary. I
am indebted to my colleague, Professor David Shores, for this point.
C. KAHN, supra note 29, at 157-58, differentiates between the casualty and medical
deductions by noting that the casualty deduction does not require an expenditure while the
medical deduction does.
61. Under current law, Z's deduction would be the lesser of 1) the difference between
the fair market value of the automobile immediately before the accident and the fair market
value immediately after or 2) the automobile's adjusted basis. The $100 compensation
would then be subtracted from the otherwise deductible amount. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)
(1977). The cost of repairs might be acceptable as evidence of loss in value. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.165-7(a)(2)(ii) (1977). Presumably, in those cases in which a taxpayer elects not to re-
pair, it would be possible that the automobile was already so dented before the casualty in
question that the additional dent caused no further decline in value; hence no deduction
would be allowable.
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destruction itself was involuntary. Requiring both involuntary destruc-
tion and involuntary replacement would be too stringent.
Second, it is inappropriate to base a determination of deductibility
on an inquiry into how essential or frivolous a given asset was, with the
notion that deductions should be allowed for replacement of essential
assets, but not frivolous assets.62 Inquiring into the frivolity of the asset
replaced would lead unavoidably to a painstaking itemization when
numerous assets are destroyed together. For example, when a house
burns down, the taxpayer under current law merely has to list the value
of the assets destroyed. If the nature of the assets were important, then
the taxpayer would have to provide a separate list of essential assets
and frivolous assets, and a justification for why the essential assets were
essential. No matter what the reasonableness of the taxpayer's initial
decision to acquire assets, their destruction is no less of a casualty, and
the taxpayer's decision to replace them should be respected.
In conclusion, realization ought to be irrelevant to the casualty loss
deduction. The operative event should be the expenditure of funds
caused by the casualty, and the taxpayer's decision to make that expen-
diture should be accepted without further inquiry.
Misplacement: Why Isn't a Loss Deductible When Theft and
Destruction Are?
It is quite clear that a mere loss of property is not deductible, as
demonstrated by the "ring" cases. Mere loss of a ring, even when neg-
ligently flushed down the toilet after being wrapped in tissue paper, is
not a qualifying casualty.63 Some outside force is required, such as the
slamming of an automobile door on the hand upon which the ring was
placed.64 Case law also suggests that, when one cannot prove whether
an item was lost or stolen, it is presumed lost and hence
62. Imagine a man who has $1,000 cash in his pocket, and is on his way to buy himself
a frivolous toy when he is assaulted and robbed. Clearly, the robbery of the cash reduces his
liquid assets, hence reduces his ability to pay, hence should be deductible. Now imagine
that he made it to the toy store, purchased his toy, and is robbed of the toy on his way home.
When he was robbed of the cash, we would not have inquired what he intended to do with
the cash. When he is robbed of the toy, should we deny the deduction because we disap-
prove of how he spent the money? This hypothetical is a variation of one in Bittker, supra
note 12, at 207. See contra U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE PERSONAL CASUALTY
AND THEFT Loss TAX DEDUCTION: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 48 (1979)
(suggesting that the loss of luxury items does not affect taxpaying capacity).
63. Keenan v. Bowers, 91 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.S.C. 1950).
64. John P. White, 48 T.C. 430 (1967), acq., 1969-I C.B. 21. See also Theodore R.
Kielts, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 81,329 (1981).
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nondeductible. 65
Perhaps the problem is one of timing. It is generally easy to deter-
mine when a deductible casualty occurs, especially since, under current
law, only sudden events can be deductible casualties. 66 In scenario
#10, the watch was last seen months ago; there is no way to tell what
happened to it, or when it happened. This problem leads to the possi-
bility of a taxpayer choosing to report the event during the most advan-
tageous tax year.
It is undeniable that, given a tax system requiring annual report-
ing, the year in which taxable events are to be reported must be defi-
nite, and for this reason the current system denies a casualty deduction
for lost, as opposed to stolen, items. A system founded upon ability to
pay concepts could permit the deduction of lost items, however, since
the operative event would be the replacement expenditure. Uncer-
tainty as to when the item was lost would be irrelevant.
Perhaps losses are currently nondeductible because it is easier to
lie about loss than it is to lie about theft or destruction. For theft, one
must presumably make a police report, and explain how the theft oc-
curred. For destruction, one could be required to produce the lifeless
corpse. However, one would hope that the requirement that the lost
asset be replaced would be some deterrent against the temptation to lie.
One problem with deducting mere losses is that the lost item might
turn up again, requiring an adjustment in subsequent tax years. Yet,
the same problem occurs with recovery of embezzled or stolen prop-
erty67 or with subsequent disaster relief payments for deductible casu-
alties.68 Casualty loss deductions in these instances have been allowed
despite the possibility of subsequent recovery.
In conclusion, losses should be as deductible as casualties. The
deduction should be taken when the item is replaced, and the later re-
trieval of the lost item should be treated in the same manner as the
recovery of stolen property.
65. Mary Frances Allen, 16 T.C. 163 (1951).
66. See generaly Comment, The Casualty Loss Deduction and Consumer Expectation:
Section 165(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 220 (1968); Comment,
supra note 56. See also ALI FED. INCOME TAX STATUTE § X 151(d) (Draft 1952), which
defines casualty losses as "[l]osses ... sustained from theft, fire, storm, accident, shipwreck,
or other similar sudden misfortune" (emphasis added).
67. Tennessee Foundry & Mach. Co., 48 T.C. 419, 430 (1967).
68. See, e.g., H. E. Londagin, 61 T.C. 117 (1973); L. R. Chronister, 32 T.C.M. (CCH)
1108 (1973); Rev. Rul. 73-408, 1973-2 C.B. 15, amplfed by Rev. Rul. 76-500, 1976-2 C.B.
254; Rev. Rul. 71-161, 1971-1 C.B. 76; Rev. Rul. 71-160, 1971-1 C.B. 75.
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Liability: Why Should It Matter if My Tree Hits My Roof or
My Neighbor's Roof?.
It shouldn't. However the word "casualty" has always been nar-
rowly interpreted, and its meaning has been confined to damage to
one's own property.69 Neither current dictionary definitions70 nor defi-
nitions from nineteenth century dictionaries 71 contemporaneous with
the first enactment of the casualty loss section support this narrow in-
terpretation. There is no theory by which one can argue that destroy-
ing one's neighbor's roof, with consequent liability, impairs one's
ability to pay taxes any less than destroying one's own roof.
The Role of "Sudden and Unexpected"
This Commentary has considered the application of the current
personal casualty loss deduction in specific situations. However, the
general pattern of current law has not been examined. According to
most commentators, the hallmarks of deductibility under current law
are that the event must be sudden and unexpected. 72 How do these
hallmarks measure up under an ability-to-pay analysis?
There are two justifications for the suddenness requirement. First,
while an event which is a long time in coming could be avoided, at least
partially, sudden events cannot. However, such an emphasis on the
possibility of avoiding the casualty suggests that negligence is relevant.
This suggestion contradicts the general notion of the system that negli-
gence is irrelevant to a determination of the deductibility of a loss.
The second justification for a suddenness standard is that it differ-
entiates between normal, continuing wear and tear and sudden, com-
plete destruction. Wear and tear, or depreciation with respect to
personal assets, is not deductible, and some means are necessary to dif-
ferentiate this wear and tear from the deductible casualty. Suddenness
is not, however, an appropriate distinction. For example, the long-
69. C. W. Stoll, 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 731 (1946); Mulholland, 16 B.T.A. 1331 (1929); An-
not., 20 A.L.R. 2d 600, 617 (1951). See Epstein, supra note 41, at 468 & n.33.
70. The relevant definitions are "an unfortunate occurrence" and "serious or fatal acci-
dent." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 349 (1981).
71. "Casualty, n. Accident; that which comes by chance or without design, or without
being foreseen; contingency. 2. Any injury of the body from accident, whether resulting in
death or not; and by a metonymy, death, or other misfortune, occasioned by an accident. In
military returns, the head of casualties embraces all men who die, desert, or are dismissed.
Campbell. 3. In Scots law, an emolument due from a vassal to his superior, beyond the
stated yearly duties, upon certain casual events." N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 180 (1857) (emphasis in original).
72. See supra note 66.
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standing case law rule against deductibility for termite damage 73 is in-
appropriate when examined in terms of ability to pay. Whether the
termites take one year or one day, an expenditure for repair of the
damage is a sufficiently uncommon diminution of ability to pay to war-
rant a deduction. Alternatively, consider an automobile transmission
which lasts an incredible 200,000 miles with no deterioration whatso-
ever, and then "suddenly" falls apart. The suddenness of the event
would be irrelevant. Since the transmission lasted longer than the av-
erage, its demise could not be viewed as an uncommon burden. What
distinguishes deductible from nondeductible wear and tear should be
whether it was extraordinary, not whether it was sudden.
Similar arguments can be made to justify the requirement that the
casualty causing the event be unexpected. First, an expected event is
possibly preventable, while an unexpected event clearly is not. Again,
whether or not an event could have been prevented really raises the
question of negligence, a question which is not supposed to be raised.
The concept of unexpected losses is also related to the concept of per-
vasive losses, where it has some value. It is difficult to distinguish the
unique occurrences from the pervasive ones. One acceptable bench
mark would be to ask whether or not the reasonable person would "ex-
pect" such an occurrence to occur. Those occurrences which are nor-
mally "unexpected" might be considered to be unique enough to
warrant casualty loss treatment.
A Proposed Statute
This analysis of the casualty loss deduction from the standpoint of
ability to pay leads to a number of conclusions. First, only those events
which do not happen commonly to everyone should be covered. Sec-
ond, losses caused by voluntary acts ought not to be deductible. How-
ever, negligent acts ought not to be considered voluntary. Therefore,
the negligent failure to insure ought not to be taken into account, and
failure to file an insurance claim when one could have been filed ought
not to defeat the deduction.
Third, extraordinary repairs or replacements caused by inherent
flaws in assets ought to be just as deductible as repairs or replacements
caused by accidents. Fourth, the realization concept ought to be irrele-
vant. Instead, the deductible event ought to be the expenditure of
funds on repair or replacement. Fifth, loss by misplacement ought to
be just as deductible as loss by destruction, theft, or other recognized
73. Rev. Rul. 63-232, 1963-2 C.B. 97.
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casualties. Sixth, there ought to be no difference between a payment
required by damage to one's own assets and a payment required by
damage one caused to the assets of another. Finally, the suddenness of
the casualty-causing event should be irrelevant to deductibility. A stat-
ute which embodies those propositions is set forth below.
Deduction for Personal Casualty Expenditures
a) The excess of-
(1) the sum of medical expenditures and personal casualty ex-
penditures exceeding $100 per casualty for the taxable year,
over
(2) 10% of adjusted gross income,
shall be deductible from adjusted gross income.
b) Any extraordinary expenditure for repair or replacement of the
taxpayer's personal possessions, or any legally required expendi-
ture for the repair or replacement of the possessions of another,
where the legal requirement arises from a nonbusiness extraordi-
nary event, shall be a personal casualty expenditure.
(1) Expenditures are extraordinary if
(A) they are caused by an extraordinary event, or
(B) in the case of automobiles, either
(i) annual repair expenditures for that automobile
exceeded annual national average repair ex-
penditures by more than 50%. In the event that
this subsection (i) applies, the excess of the ac-
tual expenditure over the annual national aver-
age shall be the personal casualty expenditure;
or
(ii) the automobile is sold for a price which is less
than 50% of the standard value of the year,
make, and model automobile. In the event that
this subsection (ii) applies, the difference be-
tween the actual sale price and such standard
value shall be the personal casualty expenditure.
(2) An event is extraordinary if
(A) it is not willfully caused by the taxpayer,
(B) it is not a common, expected occurrence.
(3) Extraordinary events include (without limitation of the
foregoing and subject to section 2(A)):
(A) fire,
(B) storm,
(C) shipwreck,
(D) theft,
(E) flood,
(F) collision, and
(G) misplacement.
(4) The presence or absence of:
(A) negligence, other than willful negligence,(B) insurance coverage, including the decision whether or
not to make a claim under such coverage,
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(C) realization of a loss, and
(D) suddenness of a loss
shall be irrelevant to the operation of this section.
(5) Any replacement expenditure pursuant to section (b)(1)(A)
must be made within three years of the event, or of its dis-
covery by the taxpayer, whichever comes last. The amount
of the replacement expenditure, which is allowable as a per-
sonal casualty expenditure, shall be the lesser of:
(A) the fair market value of an asset comparable to the
one being replaced, or
(B) the amount actually expended.
Only one expenditure will qualify per asset replaced.
(6) The Secretary of the Treasury shall annually promulgate
average annual automobile repair costs, and standard val-
ues of used automobiles, pursuant to (b)(1)(B)(i) and(b)(1)(B3)(ii).
The current casualty loss deduction is admittedly not an enormous
item in tax expenditure terms.74 It is important, however, as evidence
of the commitment of our system to adjust the tax burden on the basis
of ability to pay. The scope of the casualty loss deduction in terms of
dollars has been narrowed, 75 in part, on ability-to-pay grounds. On the
same grounds, its conceptual scope should be broadened and
rationalized.
74. Tax expenditures for casualty loss deductions were projected to range from $590
million in 1980 to $1.09 billion in 1985. Compare the net exclusion of pension contributions
and earnings, projected to range for employer plans from $12.9 billion to $24.9 billion, and
the additional exemption for the elderly, projected to range from $2 billion to $2.5 billion.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAX EXPENDITURES: CURRENT ISSUES AND FIVE-YEAR
BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1981-1985, FT. III at 33 (1980). See also STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EX-
PENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1980-1985 at 17 (Comm. Print 1980). According to the
Senate Finance Committee, the 1982 changes to the casualty loss deduction will increase
fiscal year budget receipts by $666 million in 1984, $734 million in 1985, $800 million in
1986, and $880 million in 1987. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1982).
75. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 was much kinder to the
casualty loss deduction than some of the flat tax proposals that would have repealed the
deduction entirely. See H.R. 4821, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 5513, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982); H.R. 6352, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2147, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S.
2200, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2557, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). For an ealier discus-
sion of the effect of eliminating the casualty loss deduction, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, supra note 62, at 64; STUDIES IN SUBSTANTIVE TAX REFORM (A. Willis ed. 1969).
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